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The Governors of Ottoman
Bilād al-Shām.
The Reconstruction of
Individual Biographies by
Looking at Groups of Governors
Sharing Some Common
Features. Bayt al-ʿAẓm as an
Example1
Thomas Philipp
Over the last twenty years or so we have seen an enormous development of scholarly studies of
Bilād al-Shām under Ottoman rule. This has not always been like this. The reasons for the long negli -
gence from which the historiography of this epoch suffered are various. Arab national historiogra -
phy considered the period for a long time the worst of all in Arab history – better forgotten than
studied. The demonizing of the Ottomans as the oppressors of the Arabs since 1517 found its first
major but already fully developed expression in 1916 in  al-Hilal.2 This was not the reflection of a
long experience and a developing mood but an abrupt change in attitude thanks to the rise of na-
tionalism. Later Turkish historians were much more concerned with the study of the central lands of
the Empire and what seemed from a centre point of view to be on the periphery remained peripheral
1 Editor's note: Thomas Philipp was in the process of revising this paper in early 2015. While his 
argument stood, he wished to include more source material, especially Ottoman. His untimely 
death on 11 June 2015 prevented him from completing his work. The draft is given here as it 
stood with only minimal interventions.
2 “Al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya fī Lubnān wa Sūriyya. Ḥukm arbaʿa qurūn.” Al-Hilāl 15 (1916-1917), 
serialized between Dec. 1916 and July 1917.
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with the exception of the Balkan region. German Orientalists, with rare exceptions, denied at that
time that there was any historical development in the Middle East after the classical age of Islam, and
even those who studied the Ottoman Empire, dealt with its centre or its western periphery but never
with the Arab provinces.
Eventually a rethinking of concepts such as the “continuity of history,” “centre – periphery rela-
tions,” “empire,” “modernity,” “European penetration” and especially the shift away from political his -
tory to social and economic history helped to stir a new interest in Bilād al-Shām under Ottoman
rule. It led to a multitude of monographs on the subject, with a special interest in urban and social
history, but also in economic and intellectual history.
Striking is the lack of a critically researched listing of all Ottoman governors who ruled the prov -
inces of Bilād al-Shām. Considering the vast extension of the empire and the permanent possibility
of centrifugal forces on the periphery, the governors, representing the imperial center in the prov -
inces, were the hinges, the most important link between the imperial center and its periphery. They
reflected the strength of the linkage, its flexibility and its weaknesses. Many local chroniclers, who
rose to prominence in the 18th century, understood the importance of the governors' role. They be-
gan their accounts of each year with mentioning the present governor of the province. Every change
of governor was also recorded.3 It is only to be expected that over 400 years of Ottoman presence in
the Levant considerable shifts and changes occurred in this linkage.
A chronological listing of all governors  would help to structure and confirm the general  time
frame for the history of the region. Knowledge about the governors and the times and sequences of
their rule will not only assist us to reconstruct the political history of the region or the policies of the
imperial centre in this provincial region but it would also be beneficial for research in the above
mentioned branches of urban, economic and intellectual history. Developing the sequences of gover-
nors in all the administrative provinces of Bilād al-Shām we also can trace how power spread hori -
zontally;  either in the fashion that a governor  would be  in rapid sequence appointed to Aleppo,
Damascus, Tripoli or Sidon or how a governor could succeed in having his relatives or members of
his “Household,” bayt, be appointed to further governorships or other supportive political positions.
3 See, for instance: Aḥmad, al-Ḥallāq al-Budayrī, Ḥawādith Dimashq al-yawmiyya. Damascus: Dār 
Saʿd al-Dīn, 1997; Mikhā’īl Burayk, Tārīkh al-Shām 1720-1782. New edition: ed. Aḥmad Ghasān 
Sibābū, Silsilat Dirāsāt wa-wathā'iq tārīkh Dimashq  (3), Damascus: Dār Qutayba, 1982, pp. 38-39.
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The sources for the biographies of the governors
When gathering biographical information on governors in Bilād al-Shām we are dealing with much
more than simply fixing precise dates of their governorship. From the biographical information we
learn about the origin of governors, their training, their family relations, their social environment,
the careers of governors. Over time, we can trace how these components change in the careers of
governors and with it the relations between center and periphery.
For this purpose it is important to reconstruct the biographies of governors as completely as pos-
sible. Different sources offer themselves for this purpose. Two studies should be mentioned first, be-
cause they help to establish at least a rough sequential order over time of individuals holding the
governorships in Aleppo, Damascus and the other provinces:
The first and until now only systematic attempt in Arabic to establish such a chronology was
made by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, with a compilation called Wulāt Dimashq fī al-ʿahd al-ʿUthmānī.4
He juxtaposed two different listings of governors, one by Muḥammad b. Jumʿa al-Maqqār in the 18th
century the other by Muḥammad Raslān b. Yaḥyā al-Qārī in the 19th century. Munajjid al-Dīn has
little information on the authors and at no point does he try to analyze the contradictions between
the two listings 
An older Ottoman work, Mehmed Süreyya,  Sicill-i Osmani,5 is a helpful work with almost two
thousand biographies of higher Ottoman officials throughout the centuries. Typically these are com-
piled from the archives in Istanbul, follow a certain pattern, are short and put an emphasis on the ca-
reer of the official. Here we also find for the governors the dates of their career steps and their back -
ground. The only personal aspects usually mentioned are the immediate family relations through
marriages. Other collections have also to be consulted.6 General  histories of the Ottoman Empire
might also be  of help.7 Most important is the use of the Turkish Archives.8 There the  mühimme
defterleri, firmans with appointments of governors and correspondence at time of relevant crises will
be of decisive importance. Another document of importance is the Salname Vilayet-i Suriye, Defa 25,
4 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid (ed.), Wulāt Dimashq fī 'l-ʿahd al-ʿUthmānī. Damascus: s. n., 1949.
5 Mehmed Sürreya, Sicill-i osmani yahud tezkere-i meşahir-i osmaniyye. 4 vols. Istanbul: Matbaa-i 
amire, 1308-1311. Latinized edition by Akbayar, Nuri and Seyit Ali Kahraman, Sicill-i Osmani. 6 
vols., Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996.
6 See the more recent work by Yilmaz Öztuna, Devleter ve Hanedanlar. Ankara: Kültür Bakanligi, 
1989.
7 Such as Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Tarih-i Cevdet. 12 vols. Tertib-i cedid. Istanbul: Matbaa-yi 
osmaniyye, 1309 and Ataullah Mehmed Şanizade, Tarih. 4 vols Istanbul, 1284.
8 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi.
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1310, which apparently has a complete list of Governors in Syria. The salnames can be very reliable
documents as they were compiled by Ottoman officials, using Ottoman archival materials. Other pro-
vincial salnames such as those of Aleppo will have to be consulted, too.9
As far as Bilād al-Shām is concerned Süreyya's biographies of governors remain rather sketchy until
the middle of the 17th century. Up to then the imperial government had left the running of the prov-
inces more or less to the local elites. It is only then, that local registries for the various provinces are
established.10 For the time before, we are often better off to look at Arabic chronicles or the tradi-
tional genre of Arabic literature, the bio-bibliographical dictionaries, ṭabaqāt, which continued to be
popular. The latter dealt with men of learning and not with political power brokers. But incidental
information on governors can be found, providing personal impressions of them, their relations to
the local urban elites and, sometimes, their learnedness. 11 Needless to say, neither the chronicles nor
the ṭabaqāt literature constituted a systematic treatment of our topic.
Beginning from the first half of the 18th century the volume of information grows significantly.
Three major causes can be identified for this development: First, the already mentioned direct ap-
pointments of governors – and other officials – coming from Istanbul, which resulted in a continuous
flow of reports by the local Ottoman officials and a new dimension of knowledge about the prov-
inces.
The second cause was the rise of a new genre of Arabic “contemporary chronicles,” written by lay
people, i.e. people who did not belong to the “learned classes” and, though literate, were not really
9 The salnames are now also to be found online: http://isamveri.org/salname/ (accessed 14 March 
2016).
10 Qāsim al-Ṣamad, “Niẓām al-iltizām fī wilaya Ṭarābulus fī 'l-qarn al-18 min khalāl wathāʾiq 
maḥkamat al-sharʿiyya.” In: al-Muʼtamar al-Awwal li-tārīkh wilayat Ṭarābulus ibān al-ḥiqba al-
ʿUthmāniyya. Tripolis: The Lebanese University, 1995, pp. 59-95, here p. 60.
11 ʿAbd al-Razzāq Al-Baytār, Ḥilyat al-bashar fī tārīkh al-qarn al-thālith ʿashar, 3 vols., Damascus, 
1961-1963; Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Būrīnī, Tarājim al-aʿyān min abnāʾ al-zamān. 2 vols., 
Damascus, 1959; Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, Al-Kawākib al-sāʾira bi-aʿyān al-miʾa al-ʿāshira. 3 vols., 
Beirut, 1979; Raḍī al-Dīn Ibn Ḥanbalī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥalabī, Durr al-ḥabab
fī tārīkh aʿyān Ḥalab. 2 parts (4 vols.), Damascus, 1972; Ibn Ṭūlūn, Henri Laoust, Les Gouverneurs 
de Damas sous les Mamlouks et les premiers Ottomans 1260-1744, Traduction des Annales d'Ibn 
Tulun et d'Ibn Gum'a, Damas: IFEAD, 1952; Muḥammad al-Ṣāliḥī al-Dimashqī, Aʿlām al-warā bi-
man wulyā nā’iban min al-Atrāk bi-Dimashq. Damascus, 1964; Muḥammad al-Muḥibbī, Tārīkh 
khulāṣa al-athar fī aʿyān al-qarn al-ʿashar. Ed. Muṣṭafā Wahbī. 4 vols., Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-
Wahbiya, 1284/1868; Muḥammad Rāghib ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṭabbākh, Aʿlām al-nubalāʾ bi-tārīkh 
Ḥalab al-shuhabāʾ. 7 vols. [plus index], Aleppo, 1923; Muḥammad Khalīl ibn ʿAli al-Murādī, Silk 
al-durar fī aʿyan al-qarn al-thānī ʿashar. 4 vols., Beirut, 1997, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmi; and many 
others.
4
supposed to write. They took their authority to write not from any scholarly learnedness, as the ʿ u-
lama did, but from their own eyewitness testimony.12 The causes for this literary development are
still debated. Suffice it to say that these authors were close to the daily events in their mainly urban
environment,  gave  detailed  descriptions  of  them  and  expressed  their  opinions  about  governors,
whenever they deemed it necessary.13 Their reporting on the governors, too, cannot be considered a
systematic effort. Whenever they dealt with the topic, however, their dating is very reliable and they
provide the local context, in which the governors had to operate.
Finally, we can observe in the 18th century an ever increasing European presence in the Levant,
first by the French, later also by the British and others. The French were particularly interested in
the import of raw silk and silk thread from the Levantine coast, which was soon superseded by their
desperate need for cotton with the beginning industrialization of the textile production in France.
French trade had been reorganized by the Colbert at the end of the 17th century. Marseilles Mediter -
ranean trade monopoly was confirmed and the French traders in the various ports were reorganized
in a corporation, a nation, led by a consul or vice consul. They reported to the Chamber of Commerce
in Marseille and to the French government, later to the French ambassador in Istanbul. For the con-
suls dealing with the governors and writing reports about it became a routine affair.14 For a long time
British presence and diplomatic contacts in the Ottoman Empire were managed by the English Lev-
ant Company, not to be confused with its much more powerful rival the East India Company. 15 The
establishment of European consuls in various cities began by the middle of the 18th century, they
would write regular reports to their ambassadors in Istanbul from the provinces. This helps greatly to
establish precise dates for the rule of each governor.
With European consuls came also European tourists in increasing numbers. Travel literature was
most avidly read in Europe combining entertainment with information about non-European worlds.
12 Dana Sajdi, The Barber of Damascus. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2013, p. 140.
13 For instance: Naʿūm Bakhkhāsh, Akhbār Ḥalab. 3 vols., Aleppo, 1985; Ibn Kannān (al-Ṣāliḥī al-
Dimashqī), Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā, Yawmiyyāt Shāmiyya (al-Ḥawādith al-yawmiyya). Ed. Akram 
Aḥmad al-ʿUlābī, Damascus: Dar al-Ṭabāʿ, 1994; ʿAbbūd al-Ṣabbāgh, Al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī tārīkh al-
Ẓāhir. Ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm Maḥāfaẓa, Irbid, 1999; Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Yūsuf al-
Anṣārī, Nuzha al-khāṭir fī bahja al-nāẓir. 2 vols., Damascus, 1991.
14 CADN, Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes: Ambassade de France à Constantinople 
Serie D (correspondance consulaire): Alep 1733-1914. 108 vols., Damas 1795 - 1894 vols. 0-7.
15 National Archives Kew Garden. See FO 195,196 following; FO 226,81 following; FO, 618,1 
following; FO 861 following.
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Here, too, it depended much upon the preferences and likings of the traveler, about what he would
report and which reading public he intended to address.
Consuls, travelers, local authors and Ottoman administrators expressed, according to their tasks
or interests, different opinions about the governors, whose biographies became more complex, color-
ful but also more contradictory than ever before. This development, however should not let us over-
look the fact that none of these authors intended to write systematic and comprehensive biographies
of governors or a general history of governorships. The particular perspective would always depend
on the motives of each author to write and readers he wanted or had to address. The authors of the
new “contemporary chronicles” were mainly interested in how governors dealt with economical is -
sues, specially with prices and taxation and with the general issue of justice toward the population.
Consuls wanted to find out about the malleability of governors to serve European interests. Travelers
would write in great detail if they happened to gain access to a governor and stayed for some time in
the same city as the governor. Administrators were much more interested in the relation governors
had to the political powers in Istanbul. Some governors stayed relatively long in their position, other
moved on very quickly. Some governors were communicative, some kept a certain distance in gen-
eral and from the Europeans in particular. In other words, whether we find much information about
a governor depends on many varying factors: motives of authors, access to governors and readers
addressed.
There will be governors about whom we probably will never know much more than their actual
presence in their appointed position. On the other hand there exists a vast amount of biographical
information on some other governors. Though all information we collect might be pertinent to a
general study of the functions and powers of Ottoman governors in the Levant, this imbalance of in-
formation on individuals and the often incidental and even haphazard character of this information
constitutes a problem.
Reconstruction of sources
It seems to me that, in addition to compiling biographical information on individuals, there exists an -
other method to generate information on governors. Wherever we can find families, clans, Ottoman
“households” or other groups with some common characteristics, which have produced a number of
governors they should be considered as an entity. We can then generate a composite picture within a
historical context, even if we do not have much biographical information on individuals, Investiga-
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tion can lead us to understand their interaction and cooperation as well as their competition with
other similar groups. At the same time we also can learn about the reactions of the Ottoman govern -
ment, which always was very sensitive to the issue of governors gaining too much power at the pe -
riphery of the empire. Local groups and networks must have worried the central government even
more, than individual governors sent from Istanbul.
In the Province of Shām the period between 1724 and 1822 crystallized as a very remarkable and
statistically different century from the periods before and after. Most obvious is the average duration
of appointments: two to three times as long as in the periods before and after. But perhaps most
striking are the qualifications governors brought with them to the job: in the century 1629-1724 13
governors had been trained in the Internal Palace Service (IPS), or a fifth of all whose biography we
know at this point; in the century there after at least twelve governors belonged to the ʿAẓm house-
hold, or more than one third; What is more remarkable is the extraordinary long time that some of
them held the position of governor of Damascus. In the half century between 1823 to 1877 13 gover -
nors had been ministers in the central government, or half of all. None were from Bayt al-ʿAẓm.
Whether the 18th century was also a century of great weakness or a period in which the central
government looked for new ways to control the provinces is still being debated. Certain is that in the
Province of Damascus it was a time were local dynasties flourished. One local clan in Bilād al-Shām,
Bayt al-ʿAẓm looms large in the statistics and the reports from those times.16
The origin of the ʿAẓms
Claims for their Turkish, Arab and Kurdish origin abound. When such claims are discussed with
some intensity it reflects the importance attached today to ethnicity in general or implies the retro -
spective belief that the development toward local autonomy in the 18th century signifies the begin-
nings of national movements toward independence.17 Already in the 18th century the Ottoman gov-
ernment had an interest to depict the ʿAẓms not as a local group but as one, whose roots lay else -
where in the empire. Local roots of a governor – not to mention a whole dynasty of governors – was
considered a threat to the unity of the empire. There are two major claims to the origins of the fam-
ily. Süreyya gives the following explanation:
16 See Appendix 2: al-ʿAẓm genealogy.
17 Karl Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus1708-1758. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980, pp. 56-
60.
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“In Konya there  are two persons of the “ʿAẓm” tribe’s beys with the name Ibrahim and
Kasim. Of these two Ebû Ketf Kasim Bey got famous for his braveness and died without
children. Ibrahim Bey on the other hand was in his youth, in the period of Murad IV. (1623-
40), in Baghdad and attained fame and left after his death his sons Ismail Bey and Süleyman
Bey behind. Ismail Bey was being promoted and became mutasarrif and mirimiran of Hama
and in  Jumada  I  1136/Feb.172418 he  became  vizier  and  governor  of  Tripoli.  In  Rabiʿa  I
1137 /Nov. - Dec. 1724 he became governor of Damascus and he died in 1144/06.07.1731. He
was smart, prudent and strong.”19
The chronology is just possible, about the reasons of the move to Hama we hear nothing except that
it was a promotion.
The Arab consensus is that the family originated in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿmān, midway between Hama
and Aleppo.20 One author added even the social origins of the family: “He [Ismāʿīl Pasha] was a peas -
ant from Maʿarrat al-Nuʿmān.”21 People from that town enjoyed the trust of the al-ʿAẓms, such as
Mūsā Agha, kahya and mutasallim first of Ismāʿīl, then of Sulaymān and finally of Asʿad Pasha.22 Im-
portant is that they were local people in the sense that they had lived in Maʿarrat and in Hama, later
acquiring Hama as their malikane. Before they rose to power they had no contact with Istanbul such
as a training in the palace school, or at the administrative level. They had no family connections and
no patron in the center of the empire. Presumably they had local ambitions and interests, such as
they perceived them.
The family worked its way systematically to the south as the career of Ismāʿīl Pasha shows: he
had become a mutasarrif of the sanjaq of Hama, which at the time belonged to the province of Tripo-
lis. Upon the recommendation of the governor of Aleppo 23 he was promoted and appointed governor
18 For an explanation of how to read the dates see Appendix 2: Reading dates.
19 Süreyya, vol. 3, p. 381. 
20 Muḥammad Rāghib al-Ṭabbākh al-Ḥalabī, Iʿlām al-Nubalāʾ bi-tārīkh Ḥalab al-Shuhabāʾ. 7 vols., 
Aleppo: Dār al-Qalamī al-ʿArabī, 1925. Here vol 3, pp. 266, 270 and passim.
21 Raslān bin Yaḥyā al-Qārī, “Al-wuzarāʾ ḥakamū Dimashq.” pp. 71-89, p. 77, in: Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-
Munajjid, Wulāt Dimashq fī ʿahd al-ʿuthmānī. Damascus: s.n., 1949.
22 Mikhāʾīl Burayk, Tārīkh al-Shām 1720-1782. New edition: ed. Aḥmad Ghasān Sibānū, Silsilat 
Dirāsāt wa-wathāʾiq tārīkh Dimashq (3), Damascus: Dār Qutayba, 1982. The ʿAẓms were Arabs 
and “they originated from Maʿarrat Ḥalab” i.e. Maʿarrat al-Nuʿmān. See also Shimon Shamir 
“Asʿad Pasha al-ʿAẓm and Ottoman Rule in Damascus”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies 26.1 (1963), pp. 1-28; here p. 1 n. 2. Mūsā Agha came from the same place and was
also called al-Maʿarrāwī. Ibid, p. 49-50. For Mūsā see also al-Budayrī, pp. 208, 238, 245, 247 and 
passim.
23 There are three governors which could have possibly at that time interfered on Ismāʿīl's behalf: 
Rājib Pasha, ʿArīfī Aḥmad Pasha and ʿAlī Pasha Ḥakīmzādeh. But we have no information that 
any of them actually did so. It also could have been an earlier Pasha of Aleppo, who had a 
specific interest in promoting Ismāʿīl. Shamir, p. 3 suggests a certain “Bekir Pasha” of Mecca as an
early patron. Ḥasan Yaḥyā, “Ahammiyyat wilāyat Ṭarābulus al-idāriyya wa'l-siyāsiyya fī 'l-naṣf al
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of Tripoli in 1723. Thus he became the first ʿAẓm to be raised to the rank of Pasha. Two years later
he  was appointed  governor  of  the  Damascus province,  where  he  ruled  until  his  death  in 1144/
09.07.1731.24
The rise of Bayt al-ʿAẓm25 was disrupted for a short moment when on 24 VII 1143/ 25.10.1730 a
popular rebellion broke out. The people of Latakiyya revolted against Yāsīn. He asked for 200 Janis-
saries from his father to be sent to him, which led to unrest and revolt in Tripolis. 26 Some people
were killed and the governor, Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-ʿAẓm, was besieged in his residence. The crowd
rained stones on it and shot at it using even a cannon to shoot a breach in the wall of his palace. The
guards all fled and the governor, being left alone, also tried to flee, but was caught. Initially the crowd
wanted to kill him, then to lock him up – until a notable came and calmed them down. Ibrāhīm al-
ʿAẓm, was unable to control the situation. The people had complained about the rapacious ways in
which al-ʿAẓms enriched themselves and impoverished the civil population. They voted to have a
new governor. In the meantime the Janissaries took care of security and safety in the town. 27 The
government reacted by sending a new governor, ʿUthmān Pasha from Istanbul.28 
Then the government ordered the arrest and imprisonment of all al-ʿAẓm governors and func -
tionaries. Their estates and wealth were confiscated. All submitted to the orders of the government.
awwal min al-qarn al-thāmin ʿashar min khalāl al-wathāʾiq al-ʿuthmāniyya wa-ghayrihā min al-
wathāʾiq” in: al-Muʼtamar al-awwal li-tārīkh wilayat Ṭarābulus ibān al-ḥiqba al-ʿuthmāniyya 25-
59. Tripoli [?]: The Lebanese University, 1995, p. 41 “Through mediation by the governor of 
Aleppo he became governor of Tripoli in 1723/23 II 1135.” Al-Ṭabbākh lists two Bekir Pashas who
where governors of Aleppo; the first in 1093/10.01.1682; the second in 1174/13.08.1760. See also 
al-Ṭabbāḥ, p. 271. Asʿad appeals to the same governor al-wazīr al-kabīr Bakr bāshā, wālī Jidda 
sābiqan 1153/29.03.1740 when he tries to gain possession of the malikane of Hama. He has not 
yet been identified.
24 Süreyya, vol, 3, p. 381. Shamir, p. 12 mentions fleetingly that the Mulla Khalīl Efendi Ṣidiqī helped
Ismāʿīl Pasha to obtain in 1725 the governorship of Damascus. But neither al-Mūrūdī, vol. 2, p. 82 
nor al-Muḥibbī, vol. 2, p. 133 mention this. Though it is not impossible that this happened. Al-
Budayrī, p. 144 describes how Khalīl Efendi Sidiqi was instrumental in Istanbul to help Asʿad 
Pasha to get rid of his nemesis Fatḥī Efendi ibn al-Qalānisī. Khalīl Efendi Ṣidiqī came from a 
Damascene family of scholars and judges, and spent long periods of time in Istanbul where he 
developed extensive contacts and networks, shifting loyalties and convictions whenever 
necessary in order to promote his own career and if it suited him the interests of Damascus. He 
has to be considered as one of the representatives of Bayt al-ʿAẓm in Istanbul.
25 For an explanation of the term vide supra.
26 Burayk, ed. by Sibānū, appendix 3, p.133.
27 Yūzīf Labakī, “Ṭārabulus min khilāl Arshīf al-Ābāʾ al-Kabūshiʿīn,” in: al-Muʾtamar al-awwal li-
tārīkh wilayat Ṭarābulus ibān al-ḥiqba al-ʿuthmāniyya. Tripoli [?]: The Lebanese University, 1995,
pp. 315-338; here p. 325.
28 Yaḥyā, p. 41.
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The measures, however, were quickly rescinded and all were reinstated in their positions. Only Is-
māʿīl was sent to Crete. He took his son Ibrāhīm with him. 
It was not completely unusual for the government to respond to complaints by the population
about a governor by replacing him with another one. The deposed governor was typically sent to a
lesser post. The wholesale notion to dismiss all, but also the short duration of this move, makes one
wonder. Was the central government worried about too large a power centre at the periphery? Most
likely it were the events in Istanbul which influenced the extraordinary events in the province of
Damascus. The revolt of a Janissary, Patrona, in Istanbul forced eventually Sultan Ahmed III to abdi-
cate in September 1730. Mahmud I succeeded him on October 1. Patrona continued to control the
streets and it took Mahmud I a whole year to put the rebellion out and gain power. Time and occa -
sion enough for the representatives of the al-ʿAẓms in the capital to loose their influence and regain
it again.29
Sulaymān, the brother of Ismāʿīl himself and his sons Asʿad, Muṣṭafā and Saʿd al-Dīn, Ibrāhīm and
further members of the clan all started out as governors in Tripoli or Sidon. 30 Not all became gover-
nors of Damascus but most famously Sulaymān and Asʿad ruled it for ten, respectively for more than
twelve years. Damascus was the largest urban center in southern Syria and by far the most impor -
tant one. The al-ʿAẓms considered the city their power base and it is here that they built their most
glamorous palaces, khans, public baths and madrasasas. They had come to stay. When Saʿd al-Dīn,
governor  of  Tripoli  was appointed  governor  of  Aleppo,  he  first  went  to  Damascus  to  leave  his
women folks there, before taking on his new appointment.31 Yet the ʿAẓms also never gave up their
hold on Hama, where they had huge agricultural domains. Asʿad Pasha in fact was quite dexterous in
providing grain from there, when the grain from the Hawran did not reach Damascus and famine
drove prices up drastically.32 In addition to governorships ʿAẓms often occupied controlling positions
in Homs, Latakiyya, Rakka but also in Ghaza, Ramla, and Jerusalem. Beyond this, members of the
family or its entourage would occasionally be appointed to governorships as far flung as Jidda, Diyar
Bakir and Adana, about which more later.
29 The leaders of it were invited to a dinner of reconciliation on November 24, 1731 and killed. 
Shaw, Stanford J., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol 1: Empire of the Gazis: 
The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1976, p. 240.
30 For the appointment of ʿAẓm governors when and where see Appendix 3: ʿAẓm Pashas’ 
chronological and geographical distribution.
31 Al-Budayrī, p. 204.
32 Al-Budayrī, p. 208.
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The Institution of the Bayt
Bayt al-ʿAẓm, literally “the house of al-ʿAẓm,” describes the institutionalized structure and functions
of specific, mainly local, power centers in the Ottoman Empire and is similar to the “houses,” buyūt
pl. of bayt, of the Mamluks in Egypt before and after the Ottoman conquest. The difference was that
the Mamluk “house” consisted – in theory – exclusively of imported slaves, typically from a Circas-
sian or Georgian background, some of whom would eventually become masters of the “house”, even
though there were repeatedly attempts to introduce in the second generation the own sons as suc-
cessors to power. In Syria during Ottoman times, on the other hand, the bayt included local families
at the core, controlling and leading such a bayt. Bayt al-ʿAẓm was a strongly integrated “house.” We
do hear of disputes between family members, such as the disagreement between Saʿd al-Dīn and his
brother Asʿad over how to approach the chief of the Druze, shaykh Milhim. The former had devel -
oped a friendly and conciliatory attitude toward the shaykh, while Asʿad considered him his personal
arch-enemy. That did not mean that the two brothers did not cooperate on other issues very success -
fully, such as the organization of the annual pilgrimage. In addition there existed an entourage of
sundry employees and of Mamluks, who served in various functions and enhanced the power of the
family.
Marriages between Mamluks of the ʿAẓms and ʿAẓm daughters were, as anywhere else, accompa-
nied by strategies of politics, loyalty, maintenance of wealth and social status. This in itself was not
unusual in the Mamluk households.33 Where such marriages in Bayt al-ʿAẓm differed from Mamluk
bayt in Egypt was that the names of the daughters were never mentioned while their sons' geneal -
ogy was firmly embedded in the ʿAẓm family, noting that the grandfather on the mothers side was
an ʿAẓm. Marriage as a means of upward social mobility was apparently widely spread in Syria at the
time. The most common pattern was that of a wealthy man of humble origin, little education and no
manners to a daughter from a distinguished or noble family. This of course was also the case else -
where: in Europe novels dealing with the topic fill whole shelves. The price for such arrangements in
Bilād al-Shām was that, in recognition of the higher social status of the women, the name of the ma-
ternal lineage was given to the children.34
33 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, “Marriage in Late Eighteenth Century Egypt,” in: Thomas Philipp and
Ulrich Haarmann (eds.), The Mamluks in Egyptian Society and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 283-289.
34 Margaret L. Meriwether, The Kin who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo 1770-1840 . 
Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1999, p. 61. 
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Two important branches of the family developed in this fashion. In one case the situation was
very similar to that of Mamluks in Egypt. ʿUthmān al-Ṣādiq was a Mamluk of Georgian extraction.
He served Asʿad Pasha as his kahya and mutasallim in Hama and elsewhere and was his general rep-
resentative, wakīl. He married his master's daughter. Later he was promoted by the government in
Istanbul to the rank of Pasha and his career  as governor was very similar to that of some ʿAẓm
Pashas, including a stint of twelve years as governor of Damascus. The second case, the marriage of a
daughter of Ismāʿīl Pasha to an outsider, is somewhat odd. The name of her husband, Muṣṭafā Farīd
ibn Ibrāhīm, is never mentioned except by al-Murādī, who makes no further comment about him. 35
This leaves us completely in the dark about the husband's background. Nevertheless, the offspring
from this marriage was considered fully part of al-ʿAẓm family and provided in the following three
generations six Pashas.
Another category of people, accepted and trusted by the ʿAẓms, were people sharing the same ge -
ographic origin, e. g. Maʿarrat Nuʿmān such as Mūsā who had served Sulaymān b. Ibrāhīm and Asʿad
b. Ismāʿīl as kethüda. He was appointed in early VII 1147/23.07.1746 as ruler of Sidon. Ten years later
he obtained two tughs the rank of Pasha and the task of amir al-ḥajj.
Then there were men, who attached themselves to Bayt al-ʿAẓm for a time and considered this
just as a further career step. Their loyalty and trustworthiness was in the best case dubious. Uzun
Ibrāhīm Pasha and Kanj Yusuf Pasha belong to that group. Both worked for some time for the ʿAẓms
as deli bash, as commanders of the deli irregulars. ʿAẓm governors, just like other governors, needed
to back up their authority with some military force.
A different category altogether were employees, the scribes and administrators needed for the
management of Bayt al-ʿAẓm. These tasks were filled by members of the al-Yāzijī family.
Patronage could be given for services for the Bayt. If a Mamluk or servant pleased his master and
was intelligent he could rise quickly in the hierarchy. Ultimately he was set free outside the house-
hold, where he might be useful to his master but was also more independent. Patronage could also
be given for heavy payments (bribes).36
35 Al-Murādī, vol. 4, pp. 111.
36 Herbert L. Bodman, Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826 . Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1963, p. 56.
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Bayt al-ʿAẓm in politics
The Bayt al-ʿAẓm obviously did not operate in free space. Other powerful local families and rivals
had to be taken care of; the urban population had to be dealt with; the central government and its
orders had to be considered, in which context also the relations with neighboring governors from
Mossul to Egypt and Jeddah needed some attention.
Three local families – and there may be more – have been identified, which provided governors
and were contemporaries or almost-contemporaries of Bayt ʿAẓm. There is Ṣāliḥ Pasha ʿArab, appar -
ently from Nablus. He obtained the important position of amīr al-ḥajj in conjunction with being mu-
tasarrif of Tripolis. Eventually he was made governor of Damascus (1197/1686) and later of Belgrade.
His son, Aḥmad Pasha held minor positions in Jerusalem and Nablus and finally was given, like his
father, the position of Commander of the Pilgrimage and mutasarrif of Tripoli.37 Both died before the
turn of the century and before the rise of Bayt al-ʿAẓm. Another example is Ibrāhīm Pasha Qatar
Aghasi from Aleppo. After a stint with the Ottoman Army moving against the French in 1798 he be -
came twice governor of Aleppo and in early 1804 he was made governor of Damascus. There he ar-
rested relatives of the chief Janissary commander to reduce the Janissaries power. His son Muḥam-
mad Pasha succeeded him as governor of Aleppo. When the local Janissaries heard what had hap -
pened to their comrades in Damascus and fearing the son might do the same in Aleppo, they rose in
rebellion against him. In early July 1804 he was forced to move out of the city. Two months later rep -
resentatives from Istanbul arrived and negotiated a compromise with the Ashraf of Aleppo, support-
ers of Muḥammad Pasha, and the Janissaries. Muḥammad Pasha was allowed to return as governor
to the city but only with 500 men of his own troops. He lived in the serai with his mother, two broth-
ers their wives and a sister. But he had lost all authority and the family fell into penury, even though
they had been one of the most important families of Aleppo and had married only into their own
kind.38
The only local family, which seriously challenged the power of Bayt al-ʿAẓm, was that of Ḥusayn
Pasha Makkīzādeh from Ghaza. His grandfather had been one of the wealthy merchants of Ghaza.
37 Süreyya, vol. 1, p. 197 and vol. 5, p. 1473.
38 See Süreyya, vol. 2, p. 598 and vol. 3, p. 783; Ulrich Jasper Seetzen, Tagebuch des Aufenthalts in 
Aleppo 1803-1805, in: id., Tagebücher, vol. 2, ed. by Mamoun Fansa & Michael Braune. Hildes-
heim: Georg Olms, 2011, pp.125, 129, 194, 197, 198, 202, 204, 242, 265 and passim; Al-Shidyāq, 
Ṭanūs Kitāb akhbār al-ʿayān fī Jabal Lubnān, 2 vols., ed. Fouad E. Boustany, Beirut: Librairie 
Orientale, 1970 [first publ. 1859], here vol. 2, p. 383; CADN Serie D (correspondance consulaire): 
Alep 1733-1914. IX, 1809.
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his father cultivated contacts to the governors of Damascus. Eventually he received Ghaza as a ma-
likana. Asʿad Pasha al-ʿAẓm made him his kahya in Damascus and appointed his son Ḥusayn ruler,
ḥākim, of Ghaza. With this move Asʿad had annulled the malikane status of Ghaza and brought it un-
der his control. Later the government in Istanbul gave Ḥusayn the rank of vizier and made him gov -
ernor of Sidon. After having led the pilgrimage for 14 times very successfully, Asʿad was dismissed
from his position as governor of Damascus in Jan. 1757 and replaced by Ḥusayn Pasha. Asʿad in the
meantime was appointed governor of Aleppo. When Ḥusayn Pasha set out in July 1757 to lead the
pilgrimage it ended in utter disaster. Bedouins attacked the caravan, killed many of the pilgrims and
robbed the others of all their belongings down to the last shirt. The caravan dissolved and everybody
fled for his life, including Ḥusayn Pasha. Blame for this catastrophe was quickly distributed to vari-
ous parties. The government dismissed Ḥusayn from his governorship for his utter failure and sent
him back to Ghaza. Some blamed him for his greed and not giving the Bedouins their annual pay -
ments for letting the pilgrimage pass and protect it. He blamed others for instigating the Bedouins
against him. His ignorance and lack of management was cited. The government may have finally be-
lieved the version that Asaʿd Pasha had conspired to provoke this disaster as Ḥusayn Pasha claimed
and had Asʿad executed.39 
Rivalries were not necessarily carried out over governorships. The position of defterdar, controller
of finances, of the province of Damascus and directly answerable to Istanbul, could be easily ex -
ploited as an instrument to enhance the influence and expand the power of its occupant. A striking
example in the present context is Fatḥī Efendi ibn al-Qalānisī, al-Daftardār. 40 He was a contemporary
of Sulaymān Pasha al-ʿAẓm and his nephew Asʿad Pasha. He also was the overseer  of Sulaymān
Pasha's awqāf, some of the largest in Bilād al-Shām. Al-Murādī41 provides us with a rather scholarly
and restrained biography, establishing on the first page, often in rhymed prose, Fatḥī as a man of cul-
ture,  friend  of  poets  and  scholars  of  religion,  generously  financing  the  construction  of  schools,
minarets etc. This is followed by six pages of poetry by Fatḥī and by those responding to it. The biog-
raphy ends with one and a half pages of an apologetic discussion, conceding that Fatḥī was too am -
39 This according to Qusṭanṭīn Pasha's interpretation in his edition of Mikhā'īl al-Ṣabbāgh, Tārīkh 
al-shaykh Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar al-Zaydānī ḥākim ʿAkkā wa-bilād Ṣafad. ed. by Qusṭanṭīn al-Bāshā al-
Mukhallasī. Harisa: Matbaʿat al-Qadīs Būlus, 1935, p. 76. Though the execution of Asʿad may have
had quite different reasons as we will see later. For details of the various interpretation see 
especially al-Budayrī, p. 251, n. 1.
40 Al-Qalānisī seems to be a corruption of al-Fālaqnisī, as al-Murādī, vol. 4, p. 7 has it. See al-
Buraydī, p. 93, n. 3.
41 Al-Murādī, vol. 4, pp. 7-15.
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bitious for his own good and fell  in with the wrong people, corrupted and corrupting criminals;
meant are here elements of the local Janissaries.
More than likely al-Murādī had access to the chronicle of al-Budayrī. But the person Fatḥī pre -
sented by al-Budayrī, chronicler and eyewitness in Damascus, differs considerably from al-Murādī's
description. When Sulaymān Pasha died on 07.08.743/16 VI 1156 Fatḥī Efendi began immediately to
do the accounts of Sulaymān's wealth and possessions, which had to be delivered to Istanbul. It was
not the impious haste, with which he assumed this task, which shocked al-Budayrī, but the way he
treated the entourage and especially the women of Sulaymān. He arrested several high ranking offi -
cials of Sulaymān. His whole harem was disgraced, brought out into the public, the women's cloth
and pockets were search for jewellery and gold coins they might be hiding. All were threatened with
torture in order to reveal hidden treasures. Sometimes torture was applied. The wealth found in this
manner was unimaginable.
On October 3, 1743 it was announced that Asaʿd Pasha al-ʿAẓm, the nephew of Sulaymān Pasha
and ruler of the malikane of Hama was appointed governor of Damascus and commander of the Pil-
grimage. He arrived ten days later in Damascus and left again almost immediately for the dawra, in
preparation for the pilgrimage. While he was on the dawra, Fatḥī Pasha negotiated a peace between
Asʿad and Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar, ruler of Acre. The latter sent 40 loads of rice, sugar and textiles, which he
considered as his own. “He was the Sultan in al-Shām”.42
When Asʿad returned from the dawra the notables of Damascus complained to him about Fatḥī,
but he did not take any action against him. His inaction earned him eventually the nickname “the
Saʿadiyya woman”, implying fear and cowardice. In fact, he was planning his revenge already and
proceeded cautiously. He secured his position in the city first by fighting the local Janissaries in
Maydān, secondly, when a famine threatened in Damascus he ordered grain to be brought from his
malikane in Hama.43
The power struggle between him and Fatḥī Efendi continued for almost three years. At one point
the notables of Damascus send a letter of complaints about Fatḥī to the government but it so hap -
pened that Fatḥī was at that time in Istanbul and his patron Bashīr Agha, the powerful head of the
imperial harem, intercepted the letter and passed it on to Fatḥī. Upon his return to Damascus the
latter went revengefully after all those who had signed the letter. Asʿad prepared the case against
42 Al-Budayrī, p. 120.
43 The sanjaqs of Homs and Hama, originally belonging to the province of Aleppo, were attached to 
Damascus to help pay for the expenditures of the pilgrimage. Qāsim al-Ṣamad, p. 61.
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Fatḥī with a lot of documentation concerning his malfeasance. He made his plans together with the
notables of Damascus, who signed the report in great numbers.44
He had the good sense to promise a bequest of a thousand kise (500,000 qurursh) to the govern -
ment and the good luck that the Grand Vizier, Ḥasan Pasha, was an enemy of Fatḥī, whose patron,
Bashīr Agha, had suddenly died.45 Finally Asʿad obtained from Istanbul, what he wanted: orders to
execute Fatḥī. This he carried out personally, making some of Fatḥī's closest collaborators share his
fate.46 The power of  the Qalānisī clan and its network had been crushed. But the incidence also
shows how expensive lobbying in Istanbul was and how unpredictable the outcome could be.
The ʿAẓm clan’s rise to power corresponded with a period when tendencies toward local auton-
omy at the imperial periphery proliferated. In Egypt the Mamluks came close to independence, the
Arab Greek  Catholics  in Bilād al-Shām separated from the officially  recognized  Greek  Orthodox
church, and in Acre a completely new centre of economic and political power came into existence.
Legitimation of power
Locally Bayt al-ʿAẓm tried to legitimate its power by setting up pious foundations to pay salaries to
scholars or for the maintenance of religious schools, madrasas and by initiating public construction
activities of different sorts: building or repairing roads, building mosques, fountains and schools, re-
building canals, erecting palaces. Hama and Damascus were the greatest beneficiaries of these activi-
ties, though some can be also observed in Homs and Tripoli. The most important initiators were Su-
laymān and Asʿad. Sulaymān's program was so extensive that the chronicler claimed “Nothing like it
had ever happened since Tamerlane”47
Muḥammad b. bint Ismāʿīl Pasha was another great donor. He was considered to be very pious, he
had studied and he cultivated his relations with religious scholars, learned men and poets. In addition
to his building activities,  “benefiting the Muslims,” he  gave considerable  sums for  the salaries of
scholars, stipends for students and support of the poor.48
These benevolent activities were fully appreciated by the observers. After all, they contributed in
important ways to the improvement of the infrastructure and raised the quality of life for many.
44 Barbir, p. 88.
45 Al-Murādī, vol. 4, p. 15; al-Budayrī, p. 144.
46 Al-Budayrī, p. 142.
47 Al-Budayrī, p. 133.
48 Al-Murādī, vol. 4, p. 115.
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However, they were not always unselfish gifts from the donor. Frequently a surtax was imposed on
the neighborhood or individuals to help pay for such measures. In other cases brutal force was used
to confiscate building materials. Asʿad Pasha had buildings be torn down for materials, tiles used in
houses were confiscated and a whole market was taken apart for using its stones in his projects. Our
chronicler felt the need to point out, when this did not happen: Asʿad had a road built in the Maydān
and “He oppressed nobody for that and did not take a thing from anybody.”49 
Investing in benevolent acts by donations or investments in public construction, certainly was
one way to legitimize the political power of Bayt al-ʿAẓm. Wealth alone could never do that but
wealth could consolidate their position and enhance their influence in Syria as well as in Istanbul. 
For the Ottoman government the securing of the annual pilgrimage from Damascus to Mecca be -
came the central issue for its politics in Bilād al-Shām. It was part of legitimating Ottoman rule in
general. The sultan, together with his representatives and administration, derived their legitimacy for
political authority and power from their ability to prevent enemies from abroad to attack the empire
and to maintain within the empire at least a semblance of law and order. The ability of the ruler to
guarantee to the faithful the possibility to fulfill one of his duties Islam demanded from him, the pil -
grimage to Mecca, constituted the religious source of his legitimate right to political authority and
rule.
After the conquest of Bilād al-Shām the Ottoman government had left the Mamluk administrative
order more or less in tact. Only in the last quarter of the 16th century Sultan Murad III decided to re -
organize all the administrative units in the empire into eyalets (iyalāt) or pasālıks (bāshawiyāt), con-
sisting of sub district such as  sanjaqs.50 From then on until the beginning of the 18th century the
government had left these matters to the local emirs. But that led to much infighting, disturbances
and endless local power struggles between clans, which had nothing to do with the overall strategic
interests of the Ottoman government. It first tried to first employ the aghas of the Janissaries for
managing the pilgrimage, then the government experimented with sending high officials to solve the
problem and finally gave the task to the governors of Bilād al-Shām. 51 In the century between 1724
and 1812 the government in Istanbul relied mainly on local leaders for governors.
49 Al-Budayrī, pp. 195, 215.
50 Qāsim al-Ṣamad, “Niẓām al-iltizām fī wilāyat Ṭarābulus fī 'l-qarn al-18 min khalāl wathāʾiq 
maḥkamatihā al-sharʿiyya.” in al-Muʼtamar li-tārīkh wilayat Ṭarābulus ibān al-ḥiqba al-
ʿUthmāniyya. Tripoli [?]: The Lebanese University, 1995, pp. 59-95, here p. 61.
51 Ḥasan Yaḥyā, pp. 43-44.
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The legitimacy of the dominant position of Bayt al-ʿAẓm in Syria was closely connected to that of
Ottoman rule. The link was the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Damascus was its starting point, draw-
ing thousands of pilgrims from Anatolia and the Caucasus via Aleppo and, depending on wars, poli-
tics and security, from Persia via Mossul. The religious legitimation was crucial for the general order
of the empire, where the province of Damascus played a significant role and gave its governor a par -
ticular importance. Members of Bayt al-ʿAẓm were for a long time able to provide this function suc-
cessfully and, as long as they did, they enjoyed considerable length of tenure and leeway to run the
province as they saw fit.
Against that stood the permanent worry of the political elite in Istanbul that local power centers
could develop especially on the periphery, whose leaders might be tempted to break out of the em-
pire. Recently it has been argued, quite correctly, that a wrong image has been given by historiogra-
phy of the governor of Damascus as uniting in his person also the function of commander of the pil-
grimage and commander of the military escort. Precisely in order to prevent the accumulation of ex-
cessive power in the hands of the governor the central government had made it its business to ap -
point also the amīr al-ḥajj and the amīr al-jirda. Furthermore, the governor was never appointed for
more than one year and had to be reappointed by new orders from Istanbul. This happened usually
just before the return of the pilgrimage caravan from Mecca. If the governor had led the pilgrimage
he had to wait outside of Damascus for his reappointment, before he could enter the city. The order
could be waiting for him already or he had to wait for its arrival, which could be delayed up to five
month.52 He also could be ordered to move as governor directly to another province. In addition, the
authorities in Istanbul  had established also the independent position of the accountant of the fi-
nances of the province, the defterdar, who was directly reporting to Istanbul. In Aleppo he had the ti-
tle muḥaṣṣil and had also the task to collect the taxes.
In theory this was a very reasonable attempt to keep a balance of power in the provinces, which
could prevent the accumulation of too much power in one position or person. In practice this ap-
proach worked only with governors sent by Istanbul. Typically they were trained in the central ad -
ministration of the empire and shared its vision of the empire. Having reached an upper level admin-
istrative and political career, they were exposed to quick geographic changes of their position and
the tasks they were facing. In other words they were never able to strike roots in any provincial en -
vironment, enabling them to built up a power base of their own. This scenario remained a cause for
52 Asʿad in 1754, Budayrī, p. 225.
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worry and fear among the imperial political elite down to Abdülhamid II. Only the Tanzimat reform -
ers tried to solve the issue of holding the empire together in a very different form.53
In praxis this approach failed. This was particular true where local clans built up buyūt or other
sorts of networks. Such associations or groups were, of course, aware of the government's policy to
keep a balance of power in the provinces, of which the government would remain the arbiter. The lo -
cal forces could also manipulate the system by placing other members of their network into those
positions that were actually meant to counteract their power. In the 17th century and before the gov -
ernment had simply handed over power to local clans, which could be understood in a wider sense
than family and approaching sometimes the seize of tribes. Those clans quickly lost the interests of
the empire from their sight und concentrated mainly on their local feuds with other clans.
Families in a narrower sense than clans also tried to build their power bases. Ḥusayn of Ghaza,
Qaṭṭaraghasi in Aleppo are examples for such attempts. but usually these were affairs of two or three
generations restricted to a father-son enterprise. The most successful form was certainly the  bayt,
where control remained in the family while the network could be expanded through a clientele of
Mamluks, who became close and loyal members of the family.
The success of Bayt al-ʿAẓm
The most successful of these bodies in its spread as well as in its endurance in Bilād al-Shām was cer-
tainly the Bayt alʿAẓm. Its success had to do with their policy of an informal in-house-training for
the job of sons, nephews and Mamluks by appointing them as their mutasallims or having them ap-
pointed as rulers to the lesser governorships of Tripoli and/or Sidon with the lower rank of mirmi-
ran or similar ranks.54 Either of these two positions was usually also combined with that of the amīr
al-jirda. Only then would some be given by the government the rank of pasha or vizier and would be
appointed governors of Damascus or of another province. Ismāʿīl Pasha started out as mutasarrif and
mirmiran of Hama, before becoming vizier and governor of Tripoli and later Damascus. When he
53 See Jens Hanssen, “Practices of Integration: Center - Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire.”
In: The Empire in the City. Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire . Eds.  Jens 
Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber. Würzburg: Ergon, 2002 (Beiruter Texte und Studies 88).
54 For this consult Appendix 3. The Problem with the “lesser provinces” of Tripoli and Sidon is that 
often the beginnings of a career are mentioned but not when a dismissal or promotion occurred. 
In other cases only a summarily remark is made before somebody is promoted to Damascus or 
any other larger province: “after having been governor of Sidon he was made governor of Aleppo
at such and such a date.”
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was appointed to Crete he took his son Ibrāhīm with him. 55 The latter had made his own son, Yāsīn
Bey, ruler of Latakiyya. Asaʿd Pasha served as  mutasallim and  mutasarrif for his father Ismāʿīl in
Hama and Maʿarrat Nuʿmān. When his father became governor of Damascus he would take Asʿad
frequently with him on the pilgrimage. Later Asʿad was raised to the rank to amīr rumeli with two
tughs and appointed  amīr al-jirda and governor  of Tripoli,  before becoming vizier and being ap-
pointed governor of Damascus. Muḥammad al-ʿAẓm b. bint Ismāʿīl Pasha attached himself to his un-
cle Saʿd al-Dīn, while the latter was governor in Aleppo. ʿAbdallāh Pasha's first appointment was
Tripoli with the rank of mirmiran. 
The Mamluks of the ʿAẓms regularly started their career as mutasallims for their patrons. Later
they would often enter a career similar to that of their masters. Almost all members of the Bayt al-
ʿAẓm who went into politics followed the path from Hama to Tripoli and/or Sidon, later to governor-
ships in Damascus or other provinces.
Another aspect of ʿAẓm success was their ruthless accumulation of wealth. This they did in order
to consolidate not only their position in Damascus but also in Istanbul. The political situation in Is -
tanbul, as Shamir has pointed out, had shifted dramatically. His main thesis is that the politics of the
imperial elite had become factionalized.56 Different parties fought each other and the government's
voice did not reflect anymore a united authority. Factions in Istanbul looked also to the provinces for
a clientele which they could support and use.
In reverse, this meant that provincial rivals would be prepared to pay huge sums to factions or in-
dividuals in Istanbul to represent their competing interests in the political decision making processes,
which thrived on a great lack of transparency and a dense web of intrigues.  The highest bidder
would usually obtain his wishes. But luck or misfortune also played a role in these murky activities.
If for instance, the patron in Istanbul died or in some way was disgraced his clientele, even in the
provinces, fell  into disgrace likewise and the whole patron-client relationship could collapse sud-
denly. The ʿAẓms were like anybody else in need to have an efficient representation of their interests
in Istanbul, and that was costly. Actually it was their Achilles heel, since none of them had spent any
length of time in Istanbul, be it with the  ʿulama, be it with the administration, in order to built a
strong network of patrons.
55 Süreyya, vol. 3, pp. 831.
56 Shamir, p. 14.
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After all the infighting of the various parties in Istanbul we can observe that the Istanbul govern -
ment still had considerable clout to manipulate politics in the provinces, once an official order was
issued and arrived in the provinces.57 Governors, commanders of the pilgrimage, commanders of the
military escort and other officials followed such orders without questioning. They obeyed the orders
of promotion, transfer and dismissals, though they must have known that the latter occasionally had
end up fatally. This obedience is not surprising in officials sent by the central administration since
they must have considered this as part of their career. But local officials with local power bases –
such as the ʿAẓms – followed these orders just as unequivocally. Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, governor of
Sidon but residing in Acre, was for a time the most powerful ruler in the region with the best army
in the region and a fortified city in which he successfully resisted the siege of the French army in
1798.58 He, too, obeyed immediately when, returning from the pilgrimage in early December 1796, he
was dismissed as governor of Damascus and commander of the pilgrimage.
The question arises on what this authority of the Ottoman government was based. Probably part
of the answer lies in the unreflected tradition of Ottoman authority.  But behind that loomed the
larger question of legitimacy. Leaving formally the framework of the Ottoman Empire would have
left any separatist without it. Even Ibrāhīm Pasha, son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt, while con-
quering 1831 Bilād al-Shām and eventually penetrating deep into Anatolia declared himself always
as the obedient servant of the Sultan. Most of the nascent Arab national movement could not envi -
sion a separation from the Ottoman Empire until 1916.59
This brings us to the disastrous pilgrimage of 1757 and the end Asʿad Pasha al-ʿAẓm, the most fa -
mous member of Bayt al-ʿAẓm. For this it will be necessary to first establish a time line of events:
The Chronicler al-Budayrī introduces the period with ominous events in Istanbul. On 15 III 1167/
29.01.1754 official news came that Mahmud I had died and his brother Sultan Osman III had succeed
57 Yaḥyā pp. 52-53 points out that the appointment of qadis still was in the control of the central 
government and local muftis had to collaborate with them. Which gave the government 
considerable clout in local affairs, even in the 18th century.
58 Though it must be said that the best defence was the incredible bad shape of the highways or the 
total lack of them. The fortification consisted of repaired medieval walls with some additions 
which would not have withstood the impact of modern canons. But the French had lost their 
canons off the coast of Palestine and the British navy, anchored before Acre, held the French at 
bay with its naval artillery.
59 See chapter on Tanzimat reforms etc. Philipp, Thomas, “Participation and Critique: Arab 
Intellectuals Respond to the Young Turk Revolution.” In: Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age, 
1780s-1940s: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda. Eds. Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss. 
(Forthcoming).
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him “The people of Damascus were deeply affected and became doubtful about the stability.” Budayrī
clearly linked the following events in Damascus to this situation.60
On 29 IV 1169/01.02.1756  Asʿad was confirmed as governor of Damascus – extending anew a
never-heard-of long tenure in this position. He left, as amīr al-ḥajj, with the caravan on 3 XII 1169/
01.07.1756.  On the same day his brother Saʿad was dismissed as governor of Tripoli but stayed as
commander of the military escort. He also was appointed as governor of Egypt. During the same
time Muṣṭafā Pasha, another brother of Asʿad was dismissed as governor of Sidon. Clearly this was a
weakening of the position of Asʿad by weakening those of his brothers. The returning pilgrimage
had suffered losses of life as well as merchandize. In the middle of IV 1170/ Jan.1757 Rāghib Pasha of
Aleppo was transferred to Damascus and in return Asʿad was appointed to Aleppo. Rāghib never
reached Damascus, because he became the grand vizier. Instead of him Ḥusayn al-Makkī of Ghaza
was appointed as governor of Damascus, which he entered on 5 VI 1170/25.02.1757. It might again
have been a moment when Bayt al-ʿAẓm had lost the support of its lobbyists in Istanbul. Asʿad ar-
rived on 15 VI 1170/ 07.03.1757 in Aleppo, where he was enthusiastically received. A first rumor had
it that he would stay for ten years, a second claimed that his transfer to Egypt was imminent. Asʿad
sent a message to the French consul to have the ambassador intervene on his behalf at the Ottoman
court. The consul supported Asʿad's stay in Aleppo strongly, “he is good for French trade.” The people
of Aleppo demonstrated in front of the  serai, shouting that they would not let Asʿad go. The Mufti
was forced to write a letter to Istanbul to stop Asʿad's transfer to Egypt. On 24 VIII 1170/ 14.05.1757
Asʿad was confirmed as governor of Aleppo. The population of Aleppo was jubilant. According to the
French consul they had been prepared, in case of a negative response from Istanbul, to massacre all
the dignitaries of the city. With Asʿad's appointment came also orders for the transfer of Saʿd al-Dīn
to Marash and for Muṣṭafā to assume the governorship of Mossul. Shamir mentions that Saʿd al-Dīn,
on his way to Marash, visited his brother Asʿad in Aleppo. Supposedly he suggested a revolt of the
united Bayt al-ʿAẓm against the Istanbul. If there existed such a proposal Asʿad did not accept it. But
the meeting itself must have looked suspicious to the central government.61
In July of the same year, 1 X 1170/  07.07.1757 Ḥusayn al-Makkī Pasha left with the pilgrimage
from Damascus. In the middle of September news reach Damascus that the returning pilgrimage car -
avan had been attacked at Qatrana station east of Maʿan by Bedouins who stripped them of all be-
60 Budayrī, p. 225. Osman III ruled only for three years, 1754-1757. Shaw calls his rule 
“inconsequential” It was followed by another brother Muṣṭafā III; Shaw, p. 246.
61 Shamir, p. 22.
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longings including the clothes they were wearing.  Even the  maḥmal became part  of their booty.
Many pilgrims were killed or starved and died of dehydration. Ḥusayn al-Makkī hid in a small vil -
lage before making his way back to Ghaza. Others tried to make their way back to Damascus. Al-Bu -
dayrī gives a detailed description of this catastrophe and the harrowing experience of the pilgrims.
The gravity of the events was made worse because the sister of the Sultan and high Istanbuli officials
were part of the pilgrims and perished there.
Speculation about the causes and the attribution of blame abounded. Two major interpretations
crystallized in the writings of contemporaries and later historians. According to one interpretation,
Ḥusayn al-Makkī was incompetent and greedy. He did not pay the Bedouins the usual protection
money but kept that for himself. The alternative interpretation blamed Asʿad for wanting to take re-
venge on Ḥusayn al-Makkī and to regain his position in Damascus. For this purpose he had insti-
gated the Bedouins and paid them to plunder the caravan, while creating unrest and rebellion in
Damascus. It was this interpretation that the Ottoman government made its own.
Asʿad himself was transferred in October 1757 as governor to Sivas. On the way there he was
redirected to Ankara, where he was executed by order of the government in March 1758. His execu -
tion has always been taken by the contemporaries and later historians as proof of his devious role in
creating this disaster or, at least, that the government believed he was responsible for what happened
to the pilgrimage.
It seems, though, that there might have been more important reasons for his execution. When he
was dismissed as governor of Damascus he tarried for a while in Damascus and installed his kahya
Mūsā as his mutasallim. Obviously he wanted to be informed by a reliable source about events Dam-
ascus and probably wanted to prepare his return to Damascus. Once in Aleppo he resisted the at-
tempt by the government to transfer him to Egypt. He asked the French consul to make his ambas-
sador interfere on his, Asʿad's, behalf at the court in Istanbul. He also mobilized the dignitaries in
Aleppo including the Mufti, to write letters to Istanbul. Finally he obtained confirmation of his ap-
pointment in Aleppo.
In view of the above described authority, which the Ottoman government could still apply and
the absolute obedience with which orders of appointments, transfers and dismissals were followed,
Asʿad's actions were truly rebellious. The fact that the population of Aleppo, either on its own initia -
tive or instigated by Asʿad, protested in demonstration loudly and threateningly against his depar -
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ture from Aleppo, made things even worse. More than his possible involvement in the disaster that
befell the pilgrimage caravan this was a challenge that could not go unanswered.
Periodizations
The year of 1757 witnessed without doubt a disastrous pilgrimage. But it is difficult to follow the ar-
gument of some scholars to consider it a major turning point in Ottoman policies. Bodman writes,
for instance, “[…] it was the practice of the Ottoman government to pay for the protection of the
walāya [of Aleppo] from the Bedouins. …[it] may be one of the many indications of the decline of
the central government, for we find that in the year 1757 the wālī of Aleppo became the recipient of
the money. The responsibility for the caravan and village security devolved solely upon him.” 62 This
seems to me to be only another attempt to find an efficient way to deal with the Bedouins, who
could not be defeated with a regular army.
Shimon Shamir speaks of the ʿAẓm period as “an integral part of the historical study of inhitat,
the general decline of the Arab speaking countries under the Mamluks and Ottomans.” 63 This whole-
sale judgment is still indebted to the Arab nationalist ideology after World War I, perceiving the Ot-
toman rule as the oppression by a barbaric and cruel people (the Turks) of a nation with a rich civi -
lization (the Arabs).  Karl Babir takes it already for granted: “between 1708 and 1758 […] the Ot-
toman state tried to revitalize its administration in the province of Damascus in three distinct but in -
terrelated areas: the governorship of the province; the containment of local groups; and the reorgani-
zation of the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Cities.”64 Meriwhether without further explanation de-
clares that “[t]he century from 1750-1850 was a time of upheaval and transition in the Ottoman Em-
pire. Two key processes reshaped the Empire (1) the integration of the empire into world economy
with European expansionism, (2)  decentralisation, followed by more ore less recentralization with
the reforms of the Tanzimat.”65
Between 1724 and 1805 seven different ʿAẓm governors held the position of governor of Damas-
cus; for 31 years before 1757 and for 39 years afterwards. In addition, they controlled Hama and most
of the time Sidon and Tripoli. Hama had become a malikane of the ʿAẓms while Sidon and Tripoli
were clearly lesser provinces and often under the influence of the governor of Damascus. The two
62 Bodman, p. 10.
63 Shamir, pp. 2, 26.
64 Bodman, pp. 8-10 and pp. 72-73.
65 Meriwhether, p.18. One can hardly speak of the preceding period as lacking “upheavals.”
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provinces could be run by lower ranked officials without tughs. Typically sons and relatives of the
ʿAẓm governors of Damascus used these positions to collect experience and prepare themselves for
further career steps. The task of ruling either of the two provinces came usually together with the
task of commander of the military escort for the pilgrimage, amīr al-jirda. 
Bayt al-ʿAẓm provided at least a dozen governors with the rank of Pasha and many others who
ruled as  mutasarrif,  wakīl or  muhafiz over lesser provinces. Bayt al-ʿAẓm provided rather rarely a
governor for Aleppo. After 1757 we can observe a wider spread from Egypt and Jeddah to Diyar
Bakir and Adana, where ʿAẓm governors served. This might have been a deliberate attempt to dis-
perse Bayt al-ʿAẓm from its original power base. But it also was a subtle attempt to integrate the
ʿAẓms into the imperial administrative elite. Though it is noticeable that geographically they never
came closer to the imperial center than Konya, while other governors were routinely transferred
from the Balkans to Eastern Anatolia and back.
The notion that in 1757 or close to it Bayt al-ʿAẓm had lost its power and the government gave up
its attempt to collaborate with local forces is unfounded. The patterns of failures as well as the suc -
cesses of the past continued to manifest themselves. The most important failure of the government
and the ʿAẓm governors was their inability to establish peace between the various military factions
within the city. The government lost control – and here the weakness of the imperial center was par -
ticular obvious – over troops only recently sent to Damascus. They were called the  qapuqul Janis-
saries and though not being under the command of the governor, they usually cooperated with him.
In addition there were the “local” Janissaries, known as the yerliya. These were settled in the quar-
ters of the city and had become in large part an economic mafia, demanding protection money from
shop owners and artisans and even taking over such business completely. Both sides could start a
war  with each  other  at  the  slightest  perceived insult  from an opponent.  Both  sides also always
looked for support from some factions of the general population. In addition, the governor had his
own troops, paid by him personally, which could range from a few hundred men reaching up to
5,000 men. They consisted of peoples called Arnauts [Albanians], Turkmens, Kurds, Levends, Delis
and were generally unemployed soldiers. This private army was another sign of the weakness of the
central government, which worried about strong provincial lords. It was not prepared, therefore, to
pay for the means to establish the authority of the governors. These circumstances destabilized the
situation even further.
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When the governor was transferred to another position he dismissed his troops which now were
unemployed and without sustenance. They would try to join other forces, begin to plunder the coun-
tryside or would become highway robbers. This pattern did not change before 1757 or afterwards.
In a moment of crisis the governor or the notables or the ʿulama could convoke a divan together
with the chiefs of the various troops to broker an armistice. But these were informal ad hoc divans,
lacking legitimacy, executive power and hence authority. Notables often worked against each other
and only for their individual advantage. Military commanders had a long tradition of being at log -
gerheads  with  each  other.  Any  agreement  could  not  be  enforced  and  would  routinely  collapse.
Shamir quotes a symptomatic scene:
On Friday 2 VII 1161/ 28.06.1748 Asʿad convoked a diwan assembling the ʿulama and the notables
of Damascus. He said to them: “I am about to depart tonight for the Dawrah. Take charge of the
town and do not allow any one to assault another.” They answered: Ya Efendina we are common peo-
ple, some of us are ʿulama some are poor and some are mudarrisun. Our occupation is the study and
reading of books.” He said to them: is this your acknowledgement? How can it be since you are the
notables?” They said: God forbid! The notables are only the qapuqul.” Then he said to them: “So this
is your acknowledgement, you have realized that its [the city's] notables and its guardians are the
qapuqul. Upon this he summoned the leaders of the qapuqul and delivered the town to them.66
Half a century later the situation of the ʿayan had not changed much. Soon after the French inva-
sion of Egypt Napoleon tried in July 1798 to organize a “ruling diwan” made up of Egyptian ʿulama
and very few Mamluks of old “houses.” He had declared the Mamluks the real enemies of Egypt, but
the  ʿulama had explained to him that “the Cairo mob did not fear anybody but the Turks.” Later,
when Napoleon asked why the “ruling diwan” did not take care of safety and peace in the city and
restrain the rabble and mob he was answered that “this is the responsibility of the rulers.” They may
have meant by this either the Turks or the French.67
A faint echo of this attitude reaches us more than hundred years later when some among the new
secular intelligentsia of the Arab Nahḍa ignored the continuing Turkification of the Young Turk Rev-
olution, which in Arabic was always called to “Ottoman Revolution.” After the revolution most of
them wanted to maintain the political frame of the Ottoman Empire. Some voices among them re -
ferred – now in an enlightened, rational  and positive way – to the Turks in the following way,
66 Shamir, p. 15.
67 Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti's History of Egypt. 5 vols. Ed. Thomas Philipp & Moshe Perlman. 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1994, here vol 4, pp. 17-18.
26
“There is no disagreement that Turkish elite is better equipped than ours [the Arabs] for administra -
tion and government.”68
Throughout the history of the Levant/ Bilād al-Shām two political patterns repeated themselves:
The region was split into many city states consisting of the city and territory around it, all being con-
trolled by a monarch ruling over the whole as one entity. The “city state” is therefore somewhat of a
misnomer because in itself the city was never a sovereign entity. Secondly, the region could be part
of an empire and functionaries were sent from the center to rule over the cities. What was missing
was the option for the development of an urban ruling class to develop. If the monarch or the impe -
rial official did not have the means to enforce their political will, the result would be chaos.
The success of the Ottoman Empire and the Bayt al-ʿAẓm until the turn of the century consisted
of the continued control over the pilgrimage. This reasserted the legitimate authority of both and
motivated the central government to let individual ʿAẓm governors stay in their position for long pe -
riods, ʿUthmān al-Ṣādiq and Muḥammad b. bint Ismāʿīl each for some ten years. This is comparable to
the ten years of governorship of Sulaymān b. Ibrāhīm and the more than a dozen years of Asʿad b. Is -
māʿīl in the first half of the century. The length of these four governorships is extremely untypical
for the appointments of governors during the time of Bilād al-Shām under Ottoman rule.69 But it en-
abled the governors to improve the administration and reduce civil strive at least in comparison to
what was happening to Aleppo during the same period.
It has been said that with ʿAbdallāh Pasha's last dismissal from the governorship of Damascus in
1807 Bayt al-ʿAẓm ceased to play a political role in Ottoman politics. This is  grosso modo correct.
Sidon had been lost to the al-ʿAẓms since 1776 when the whole coast came under the control of Aḥ -
mad Pasha al-Jazzār who ruled over it from his residence in Acre. After him one of his Mamluks, Su -
laymān Pasha, controlled the whole coast from Ghaza to Latakiyya – with the exception of Beirut –
between 1806  and 1819,  occasionally being appointed governor of Damascus in addition. The Ot -
toman government continued experimenting with various approaches. Neither ʿAbdallāh Pasha nor
his successor Kanj Yūsuf were able to deal with the issue of the invading Wahhabis. Only the troops
of the semi-independent Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt were able to solve the problem for the Ottoman
government. ʿAbdallāh still ruled the sanjaq of Hamid in 1812.
68 Thomas Philipp, Jurji Zaydan and the Foundations of Arab Nationalism . Part Two: Anthology. 
Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2014, p. 406.
69 See Appendix 3.
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In Bilād al-Shām we can observe a definite trend to rely again more – but not exclusively – on ad-
ministrators from Istanbul, but serious structural changes had to wait until the Egyptian conquest of
the area in 1832 and until the Tanzimat reforms in the 1840s. But this alone does not explain the to -
tal disappearance of Bayt alʿAẓm from the Ottoman political scene and the answer has to be looked
for on two levels.
On the first level we have to do with the typical course of family histories. The ʿAẓms had a re -
markable run on the power politics in the southern part of Bilād al-Shām for 80 years. There are only
a few families, apart from nobility, who survived for several centuries such as the Du Ponts 70 or the
Rothschilds. The saying “From shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations” describes much bet-
ter the typical rise and fall of families in business or politics. In that sense the longevity of the al-
ʿAẓm family is indeed remarkable. After three to four generations – they often overlap – dealing in-
tensely with political power, younger descendents lost their interests. Political power had helped ac -
cumulating wealth which was there to be enjoyed. ʿAlī Bey b. Muḥammad is a good example for the
path taken. He was a very private man, staying out of public view and tended to his considerable
wealth invested in agricultural land and cattle. When Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār wanted to share his
wealth, he refused. He was killed for his refusal. Khalīl, son of ʿAbdallāh, apparently held a position
of governor and amīr al-jirda with the rank of mirimiran in Tripoli for only a brief time in 1796. The
same is true for Ḥasan Pasha b. ʿUthmān al-Ṣādiq Pasha in 1783. Neither was promoted to more im-
portant positions. Yūsuf Pasha b. Muḥammad Pasha appears to have had in the beginning a strong
political career but then began to take awkward measures as for instance by appointing himself in a
moment of crisis as governor of Aleppo “until somebody else is appointed.” He was later demoted,
than given back his rank and appointed governor of Tripoli in 1190/ 25.05.1800 but the people did
not let him enter the city. As the editor of al-Budayrī's work remarked: “He had no fortune in his
governing.”71 ʿAbdallāh himself, though belonging to an earlier generation, might have been already
part of the problem of political fatigue. He was born around 1725. We read that with the rank mirim-
iran he was made governor of Tripoli and amīr al-jirda at some point. In 1784 when he was almost
60 years old, he was appointed governor of Sivas with the rank of vizier. What had he done up to
then? We simply don't know yet. After Sivas he was appointed governor in more provinces than any
other  al-ʿAẓm  but  always  for  one  year.  As  governor  in  Aleppo  he  left  politics  to  Ibrāhīm  al-
70 The Du Ponts arrived in 1800 in the US, founded a gun powder manufacture, developed it into 
one of the largest chemical company and are until today active in the politics of Delaware.
71 Al-Budayrī, p. 51.
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Qaṭṭaraghasi, the local strongman.72 The French found him rather ineffective. The government could
not quite make up its mind about him and appointed him three times as governor of Damascus until
dismissing him finally for his inability to deal with the Wahhabis. The political role the al-ʿAẓms had
played in the 18th century had come to an end.
From the mid-nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century we can observe the
ʿAẓm family resurging. It was now much enlarged in numbers. 73 There developed differentiations be-
tween rich and poor branches of the family and even the social status was not the same for all any -
more. Its members chose often careers outside politics. They participated as individuals in the Arab
intellectual resurgence, the Nahḍa; they worked as administrators; many were attracted to the free
professions. A new political interest focused on the politics of the city of Damascus and eventually of
the new state of Syria in which some ʿAẓms participated. The last was Khālid al-ʿAẓm, who in the
forties and fifties of the last century pursued an intensive political career as member of the Syrian
parliament, minister and repeatedly as prime minister.
On the second level we have to look at the important changes in Bilād al-Shām during the 19th
century and the fate of the institution of the bayt. When Ibrāhīm Pasha had conquered all of Bilād
al-Shām he unified the various Ottoman provinces and made Damascus the seat of the central gov-
ernment.  He attached to this government various councils, which changed the political structure
profoundly. Here notables met and had to work out their conflicting interests. The reformers of the
Tanzimat period reestablished first the old provinces. But they introduced consultative councils for
each province and finally for each sub-district. The bayt as the institutionalized seat of power and the
bundling of the interests of one family and its followers had lost its role.
72 Bodman, p. 117.
73 See Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics. Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18 th 
and 19th Centuries. Stuttgart – Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1985.
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Appendix 1: Reading Dates
All dates are given in both calendars: AD and AH. The date before the slash indicates the date given
in the text. The date behind the slash indicates the calculated date in the other calendar. The se-
quence is always dd mm yyyy. The months of the Islamic calendar are indicated by Roman numerals.
1) A precise date is given in the text and calculated for the other calendar:
29 IV 1169/ 01.02.1756 
07.03.1757/ 1170 VI, 15.
2) Month and year are given: the equivalent appears in the other calendar
V 1170/ Jan.1758
09.1748/ IX 1161 
3) Only the year is given. The day of the beginning of this year in the other calendar is indicated.
1163/11.12.1749
1775/28 X 1188
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Appendix 2: al-ʿAẓm genealogy.
Al-ʿAẓm Family Tree
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Ibrahīm al-ʿAẓm
A) Ismāʿīl
d.1144/173
B) Sulaymān
d.1144/1747
C) Mūsā
d.1156/1755
D) Muḥammad
1) Asʿad P.
d.1171/X 15,1757
2) Ibrāhīm P. 3) Muṣṭafā P.
d. 1160/1747
4) Sāʿd al-Dīn P.
d.1174 IX 11/1761
daughter m.
Muṣṭafā Fāris
ʿAẓm-woman m.
ʿUthmān Ṣādiq P.
d.1174/1761
Yāsīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān P.
d. 1229/1814
Muḥammad 1. P.
d. 1197/16.4.1783
Salīm Ḥasan P. Muḥammad 2
d. VIII 9, 1197/1783
ʿAbdallāh P.
d. 1228
(b. ca. 1138)
Yūsuf P.
d. after 1213
Muḥammad P. Ḥāfiẓ  P. ʿAlī (killed by al-
Jazzār)
Muḥammad P.
Nasūḥ P.
d. 1229
Khalīl P.
d.1212/1798
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān P.
d.1197/1783
+ 3 filles
Darwīsh P.
d. after 1201
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B) Sulaymān Pasha (according to Budayrī)
d.1144/1747
1) Aḥmad Bey 2) Kharmā (cf. 
Budayrī, 117f)
3) Ibrāhīm (cf. 
Budayrī, 117f)
4) Khalīl Bey
(his family still (1890 
living in Damascus;
Sicill-i Osmani  v, 1546.)
C) Mūsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-ʿAẓm and brother 
of Ismāʿīl Pasha, d.1156/1755
D) Muḥammad (according to Budayrī)
1) ʿAbdallah 2) Yūsuf
Appendix 3: ʿAẓm Pashas’
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Sulaym
ān
1155/1742
1156/1743
1157/1744
Asʿad
1158/1745
1159/1746 M7
Saʿd al-D
īn
8
1160/1747 M9
1161/1748
Asʿad
1162/1749
1163/1750
1164/1751 Sa10
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Places
Years
(hijri/AD)
H
am
a
Sidon
Tripoli
D
am
ascus
A
leppo
Egypt
Jeddah
M
arash
Konya
Rakka
Sivas
D
iyarbekir
Adana
Icel sanjaq
Urfa
1165/1752    Saʿd al-D
īn
1166/1753
1167/1754
1168/1755 M11
1169/1756
1170/1757 As12 Sa13 As14 M15
1171/1758 Sa16 Ab17 As18
1172/1759 U19
ʿU. Ṣ. 20
Sa21
1173/1760
ʿUthm
ān Ṣādiq
22
1174/176
M
uḥam
m
ad 2
23
Sa24
1175/1762 Sa Sa25
1176/1763 M26
1177/1764
1178/1765
M
ḥd 1
271179/1766
1180/1767
1181/1768
1182/1769
1183/1770
M
ḥd 1 ?1184/1771 D28
1185/1771
M
uḥam
m
ad 1
29
U30
1186/1772
1186/1773
1187/1773
1188/1774
1189/1775 M31 M32 M33 M34
1190/1776
1191/1777 Ib35 I236
1192/1778
1193/1779 Y37 M38 M39
1194/1780
1195/1781 Y40 M41 M42
1196/1782 A43 I244
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Places
Years
(hijri/AD)
H
am
a
Sidon
Tripoli
D
am
ascus
A
leppo
Egypt
Jeddah
M
arash
Konya
Rakka
Sivas
D
iyarbekir
Adana
Icel sanjaq
Urfa
1197/1783 D45 A46 N47
1198/1784 D48
1199/1785
D
arw
īsh
49
1200/1786 A50
1201/1787 A51
1202/1788 IU52 A53 Y54 Y
1203/1789 H55
1204/1790
1205/1790-91 IU
1206/1791-92 A56
1207/1792-93 IU57
1208/1793-94 A58 A59
1209/1794-95
ʿA
bdallāh
1210/1795-96
1211/1796-97 K60
1212/1797-98 A61
1213/1798-99 Y62 A63 A64
1214/1799-00 A65
ʿA
bdallāh
N66
1215/1800-01 Y67 N68
1216/1801-02
1217/1802
1218/1803
1219/1804
ʿA
bdallāh
1220/1805
1221/1806 Y69
1222/1807 K70
1223/1808 K A71
1224/1809 K
1225/1810
1226/1811
1227/1812 A72
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1 Ismāʿīl, Feb. 1724 vizier. Was before 1723 mutasarrif and mirmiran of sanjaq Hama.
2 1137/20.09.1724 mirmiran, amīr al-jirda, mutasarrif.
3 Ismāʿīl, d. 1144/ 06.09.1731.
4 Sulaymān.
5 Asʿad.
6 Sulaymān, 1152/10.04.1739.
7 Mūsā, freed Mamluk of Asʿad. Early VII 1159/23.07.1746 appointed as ruler of Sidon. On 10 III 1170/23.11.56 
obtained 2 tugh, app. in the same year amīr al-ḥajj. On 27 XII 1170/12.09.1757 he suffered the attack by tribes on 
the pilgrimage at Qatrana and died a few days later. Was he all the time ruler then governor of Sidon?
8 VII 1159/July 1746 mirmiran, controlled the malikane of the sanjaq ot Tripoli.
9 Muṣṭafā al-Qawwās, b. Ismāʿīl. Middle of V 1160/end May 1747 his brother Asʿad, governor of Damascus, 
obtained for him governorship of Sidon as bey. In 1167/Aug. 1754 gets 1 tugh and shares with brother Saʿd al-Dīn
the task of amīr al-ḥajj.
10 Saʿd al-Dīn, I 1164/July 1750 vizier, amīr al-ḥajj.
11 Muṣṭafā al-Qawwās, b. Ismāʿīl. Middle of V 1168/27.02.1755 his confirmation as governor of Sidon. Early 
1170/27.09.1756 deposed and transferred to Adana, but redirected to Mossul; both doubtful that he went. He 
retired to Hama and died there in 1169.
12 Asʿad.
13 Saʿd al-Dīn.
14 Asʿad.
15 Muṣṭafā Pasha, soon after moved to Mossul.
16 Saʿd al-Dīn.
17 ʿAbd al-Raḥmn Pasha b. Asʿad, Governor of Tripoli and amīr al-jirda.
18 Asʿad, on way there executed VIII 1171/April 1758.
19 ʿUthmān, before mutasallim of Asʿad, then his wakīl.
20 ʿUthmān Ṣādiq, V 1172/Jan 1759 beylerbey. IX 1172/April 1759 vizier with 3 tugh.
21 Saʿd al-Dīn.
22 ʿUthmān Ṣādiq, IX 1172/April 1759 vizier, amīr al-ḥajj, 3 tughs, returns 3 V 1174/11.12. 1760 to Damascus.  
Dismissed in 1185.
23 Muḥammad 2 b. ʿUthmān as beylerbey.
24 Saʿd al-Dīn.
25 Saʿd al-Dīn, died I 1176/July 1762.
26 Muḥammad 1, 1176/23.07.1762, first mimiran then Pasha with 2 tughs and governor.
27 Soon transferred from Urfa to Adana. He proceeded via Aleppo where he arrived I 1179/July.1765 and was 
redirected to Sidon, where he arrived early II 1179/July.1765.
28 Darwīsh b. al-Ṣādiq ʿUthmān, mutasarrif of Tripolis in 1771/14 IX 1184.
29 Muḥammad 1, died on 11 V 1197/14.04.1783 aged 54. His successor Muḥammad 2 died after only 29 days.
30 ʿUthmān, died 4 IV 1186/24.03.1773.
31 Muḥammad 2.
32 Muḥammad 2.
33 Muḥammad 2, after short stay in Aleppo. In III 1190/ May1776 he was arrested and stripped of his vizier rank.
34 Muḥammad 2, after short stay in Aleppo.
35 Ibrāhīm.
36 Ibrahīm 2.
37 Yūsuf Pasha b. Muhammad 1, with the title mimiran. He became mutasarrif an and amīr al-jirda before 
1195/1781.
38 Muḥammad 2; 1193/19.01.1779: His rank of vizier was given back to him. 1194/08.01.1780
second time.
39 Muḥammad 2, briefly.
40 Yūsuf b. Muḥammad 1. On 15 VI 1195/08.06.1781 arrived in Aleppo as vizier and governor. On 9 X 
1195/14.09.1781 he left Aleppo.
41 Muḥammad 2, 1195/28.12.1780 amīr al-ḥajj.
42 Muḥammad 2, 1196/17.12.1781.
43 ʿAbdallāh, with the title of mirmiran he became amīr al-jirda and governor of Tripoli.
44 Ibrāhīm 2.
45 Darwīsh in 1197 mutasarrif of Sidon after both Muḥammads' deaths, he is raised to vizier position and made 
governor of Damascus. Deposed in IV 1199/12.01.1785.
46 ʿAbdallah b. Muhammad, 1198/16.11.1783. Before this, he was as mirmiran and amīr al-jirda ruler of Tripoli.
47 Nasūḥ 
48 Darwīsh.
49 After his dismissal dies in Damascus.
36
50 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad. As vizier he became governor in IX 1200/July1786. After he was deposed he was 
brought to Rhodos.
51 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, XI 1201/Aug. 1787.  Afterwards in Konya.
52 Ibrāhīm Uzun.
53 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad. Date not clear.
54 Yūsuf Bey.
55 Ḥasan.
56 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, appointed V 1206/Jan1792.
57 Ibrāhīm Uzun.
58 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad.
59 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, appointed 1208/09.08.1793 for a very short time.
60 Khalīl b. ʿAbdallāh. In IV 1211/Oct.1796 after being mirmiran he became governor and amīr al-ḥajj. He died a 
couple years later. His elder brother Ḥusayn became qapucu bashi.
61 ʿAbdallāh.
62 Yūsuf.
63 ʿAbdallāh.
64 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, 1113/15.06.98, Diyarbekir briefly in addition to governorship of Egypt.
65 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bey b. Saʿd al-Dīn. He died 1229/24.12.1813.
66 Nasūḥ.
67 Yūsuf b. Muhammad, 1215/25.05.1800, appointed governor of Tripoli. The people refused to let him enter. After a 
few days of fighting he withdrew to Latakiyya.
68 Nasūḥ.
69 Yaḥyā Bey al-ʿAẓm, mutasallim.
70 Kanj Yūsuf. 
71 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, III 1223/May 1808.
72 ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad, 1227 mutasarrif of sanjaq Hamid. He died in Hama in 1228.
37
